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I.

INTRODUCTION

“The courts finally realized that a child perpetrator—even of a
horrible, insane, notorious crime—warrants a different kind of justice.” 1


*
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Broad College of Law. This article was written to raise awareness to the juvenile sentencing issues that
are currently taking place in the United States. Other countries are analyzed for the purpose of finding a
way to improve our system in the United States. She would like to thank her parents for their love and
support during every obstacle and milestone in her law school career.
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The re-sentencing cases that are currently taking place throughout the
United States stem from the decision in Miller v. Alabama.2 This case held
that sentencing juveniles to life without the possibility of parole, even for
major offenses, was considered cruel and unusual punishment under the
Eighth Amendment. 3 This is one of many cases that address the resentencing of juveniles. Four years after the Miller decision, the Supreme
Court addressed the issue of retroactivity in Montgomery v. Louisiana.4
The Court held that their decision in Miller v. Alabama should be
considered a new substantive constitutional rule, retroactive on state
collateral review. 5 As a result of this decision about 2000 juveniles now
have a chance to be re-sentenced.6
Prior to the Montgomery decision, the Florida Supreme Court, like
other state courts throughout the United States, took steps to restructure its
treatment of juveniles.7 For example, the Florida Supreme Court found that
the Florida parole commission did not take into consideration how juveniles
are different than adults. 8 On Thursday, May 26, 2016, the Florida
Supreme Court “dramatically expanded the number of juveniles—all of
them convicted decades ago when the state still had a parole system—who
can now ask a judge to set them free.”9 The Florida Supreme Court decided
to give these juveniles a second chance by adopting the decision in Miller
and applying it to its parole commission. 10
The Supreme Court’s decision in Montgomery v. Louisiana has caused
uproar throughout the states. Inmates who were juveniles when sentenced
now have the opportunity to have their case reviewed in light of these


1.
Fred Grimm, The Madness Behind Middle-School Killer’s Case, MIAMI HERALD (Oct.
17, 2015, 4:54 PM), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/news-columns-blogs/fred-grimm/article
39616800.html.
2.

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012).

3.

Id. at 470, 489.

4.

Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016).

5.

Id.

6.
Saki Knafo, Here Are All the Countries Where Children Are Sentenced to Die in Prison,
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 20, 2013, 3:41 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/20/juvenile-lifewithout-parole_n_3962983.html.
7.
David Ovalle, Ruling Gives Hundreds of Juvenile Murderers Shot at New Sentences,
MIAMI HERALD (May 26, 2016), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/broward/article
8004 0602.html.
8.

Id.

9.

Id.

10.

Id.
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decisions.11 This article will discuss the direct effect of recent juvenile resentencing decisions as well as the indirect effect it has on the state and the
families of the victims. This article will further look towards other
countries to find some resolution or means of improving the system the
United States currently has in place.
Section II of this analysis will discuss precedent and recent case law
affecting the juvenile sentencing scheme in the United States, while
focusing on the application in Florida as an example. Section III will
discuss the juvenile justice system reform and the consequences of these
decisions. Section IV will discuss the juvenile justice system in the United
Kingdom and will compare it with the system in the United States. Section
V will discuss the juvenile justice system in Colombia and will compare it
with the system in the United States. Section VI will discuss the juvenile
justice system in Australia and will compare it with the system in the
United States. Section VII will conclude by discussing how the system
could be improved and whether juveniles who were sentenced to life
without parole in the United States should be subject to re-sentencing.
II.
A.

THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES

Precedent Case Law in the United States

Throughout the nineteenth century, the United States has progressively
worked towards providing troubled juveniles with a meaningful chance at
rehabilitation and reintegration through the creation of juvenile courts and
limited, special program-options as an alternative to incarceration.12 This
section will discuss how the Supreme Court has steadily evolved its
decisions to provide juveniles with fair and adequate sentencing. This
progression dates back to the 1960s where the Supreme Court ruled that an
adolescent defendant was entitled to a hearing and a statement of reasons as
to why a juvenile court made the decision to waive jurisdiction to the


11.
Joshua Rovner, Juvenile Life without Parole: An Overview, THE SENTENCING PROJECT
1, 1 (May 5, 2017), http://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Juvenile-LifeWith
out-Parole.pdf. “Approximately 2,500 juveniles throughout the state now have a chance for release.”
Id.
12.
The History of Juvenile Justice, A.B.A. 4, 5, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/
aba/migrated/publiced/features/DYJpart1.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2017); see also
Matthew Wallin, 13 Typical Punishments for Juvenile Offenders, WALLIN & KLARICH: CAL. CRIM.
DEF. BLOG, https://www.wklaw.com/juvenile-crime/13-punishments-for-juvenile-offenders#ref1.
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criminal court. 13 However, in the last decade, courts have re-framed their
views on juvenile sentencing. 14 This is a result of the increasing number of
juveniles that are currently serving life sentences without parole. 15 The
Eighth Amendment prohibits excessive bail, excessive fines, and bans the
use of cruel and unusual punishment. 16 Thus, the Supreme Court is steadily
emphasizing a juvenile offender’s Eighth Amendment rights to correct the
existing sentencing system.17
In Eddings v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court decided that all state
courts, when sentencing a juvenile, must “consider all relevant mitigating
evidence and weigh it against the evidence of the aggravating
circumstances.” 18 This decision was a result of the trial judge determining
that he did not want to, “as a matter of law, consider in mitigation the
circumstances of petitioner’s unhappy upbringing and emotional
disturbance.”19 The judge considered that the only mitigating circumstance
was the petitioner’s youth, which in effect, is not sufficient to outweigh the
aggravating circumstances of the case. 20 The Supreme Court in this case
held that the death sentence in question was to be vacated and the cause was
remanded for further proceedings. 21
In 2005, the Supreme Court in Roper v. Simmons explained that the
prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishment” must be interpreted “by
considering history, tradition, and precedent.” 22 In doing so, the Court must
refer to the “evolving standards of decency that marks the progress of a
maturing society” to avoid punishments that are disproportionate to
offenses.23 Roper provides three differences between adults and juveniles
under the age of eighteen.24 First, juveniles tend to display “a lack of


13.

The History of Juvenile Justice, supra note 12, at 6.

14.

See generally Rovner, supra note 11, at 1.

15.

Id.

16.

U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.

17.

Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 48 (2010).

18.

Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 117 (1982).

19.

Id. at 104.

20.

Id.

21.

Id. at 105.

22.

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005).

23.

Id. at 561.

24.

Id. at 569.
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maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility,” more so than
adults.25 Second, “juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative
influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure.” 26 Third, the
character of juveniles “is not as well formed as that of an adult.”27 Given
that a juvenile’s personality is still developing, his or her personality is
considered transitory.28 This case reassures that juveniles have more of a
diminished culpability than adults do, thus deserving different treatment.29
Five years later, the Supreme Court used this precedent in Graham v.
Florida, which led to the beginning of a movement towards the resentencing of juveniles.30 Graham involved a sixteen-year-old young man
with a rough upbringing. 31 In July of 2003, he and another three individuals
around the same age “attempted to rob a barbeque restaurant in
Jacksonville, Florida.”32 Florida law allows prosecutors to exercise
discretion when charging sixteen and seventeen-year-olds as adults or
juveniles for felony crimes.33 Graham was arrested for attempted robbery
and the prosecutor on his case decided to charge him as an adult. 34 Graham
was charged with “armed burglary with assault or battery” and attempted
armed robbery.35
Under the offered plea agreement, Graham pleaded guilty to both
charges.36 However, after a heart-felt letter, promising that it was his “first
and last time getting in trouble” the trial court accepted the plea deal,
withheld adjudication of guilt as to both charges and sentenced Graham to
concurrent three year terms of probation. 37 Despite this plea deal, Graham


25.

Id.

26.

Id.

27.

Roper, 543 U.S. at 570.

28.

Id.

29.

Id. at 571.

30.

Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 48 (2010).

31.
Id. at 53. Graham’s parents suffered from drug addiction and at an early age he was
diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. Id.
32.

Id.

33.

FLA. STAT. § 985.557(1)(b) (2016); Graham, 560 U.S. at 53.

34.

Graham, 560 U.S. at 53.

35.

Id.

36.

Id. at 54.

37.

Id.
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was arrested six months later, once again, for a home invasion robbery. 38
Interestingly enough, Graham was only thirty-four days away from his
eighteenth birthday on the night he committed the robbery.39
The trial court found Graham guilty and “sentenced him to the
maximum sentence authorized by law on each charge: life imprisonment
for the armed burglary and fifteen years for the attempted armed robbery.” 40
Before reaching the Supreme Court, the First District Court of Appeal of
Florida took into consideration the seriousness of the offenses as well as
their violent nature. 41 It noted that Graham was not a pre-teen when he
committed the offenses and pointed to the fact that he was sentenced at the
age of nineteen. 42 The Supreme Court then decided that a sentence of life
without parole for juvenile offenders who have not committed a homicide
offense is considered to be cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment.43 As determined in Roper, the Court must look towards the
evolving standards of decency. 44 The Court wants to enforce the Eighth
Amendment by emphasizing that punishments should be proportional to the
offenses.45 In Graham’s case, however, nothing prohibited Florida courts
from “sentencing a juvenile nonhomicide offender to life without parole”;
therefore, the sentencing judge sentenced Graham as he did because he
found him incorrigible.46
The Supreme Court determined that a state does not need to guarantee
an offender eventual release. 47 However, if it chooses to impose a sentence
of life, it must provide a defendant with an opportunity to obtain release
before the end of his or her prison term. 48 Therefore, the Supreme Court of
the United States reversed the judgement of the First District Court of
Appeal of Florida and determined that the Constitution prohibits a life


38.

Id.

39.

Graham, 560 U.S. at 55.

40.

Id. at 57.

41.

Id. at 58.

42.

Id.

43.

U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; Graham, 560 U.S. at 74.

44.
01 (1958)).
45.

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 561 (2005) (citing to Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–
Graham, 560 U.S. at 59.

46.

Id. at 76.

47.

Id. at 82.

48.

Id.
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without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit a
homicide.49
Two years later, the Supreme Court made another decision that would
once again reform juvenile sentencing. The case of Miller v. Alabama
determined that a mandatory sentence of life without parole for a juvenile
under the age of eighteen was considered cruel and unusual punishment,
thereby violating the Eighth Amendment, even in a homicide offense.50
The Court reviewed the cases of two juveniles: Kuntrell Jackson and Evan
Miller.51 The first case the Court reviewed under Miller was the case of
Kuntrell Jackson, a fourteen-year-old who participated in a plot to rob a
video game store. 52 Before approaching the store Jackson found out that
one of his friends was carrying a sawed-off shotgun in his coat sleeve. 53
Initially, Jackson stayed outside while his friends were inside the store, but
moments later he entered and witnessed his friend shoot the store clerk after
threatening to call the police. 54 Jackson’s case was transferred to adult
court where he was charged with capital felony murder and aggravated
robbery.55
The second case the Court reviewed was the case of fourteen-year-old
Evan Miller who, after an evening of drinking and using drugs, beat his
neighbor with the help of a friend, and set the man’s trailer on fire which
led to his death. 56 At one point, Miller placed a sheet over the neighbor’s
head and told him, “I am God, I’ve come to take your life.”57 Miller’s case
was transferred to adult court where he was charged with murder in the
course of arson. 58 Miller was eventually found guilty and the trial court
sentenced him to the statutorily mandated punishment of life without
parole.59 The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals later affirmed this


49.

Id.

50.

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 460, 479 (2012).

51.

Id. at 465, 467.

52.

Id. at 465.

53.

Id.

54.

Id.

55.

Miller, 132 U.S. at 466.

56.

Id. at 461.

57.

Id. at 468.

58.

Id. at 469.

59.

Id.
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decision.60 Miller appealed, and the Supreme Court of the United States
granted certiorari.61
The Court in Miller relied on the decisions from Roper and Graham.62
The Court concluded that the mandatory schemes in place did not allow a
sentencing judge to consider the youth of a juvenile defendant; it did not
allow for a judge to assess whether the law’s harshest term of imprisonment
proportionately punished a juvenile.63 Roper and Graham, as emphasized
by this Court, highlighted how the distinctive attributes that are unique to
juveniles “diminish the penological justifications for imposing the harshest
sentences on juvenile offenders.”64 This is because sentencing them to life
without parole is essentially determining that the juvenile should be
incapacitated because he is incorrigible; this is a trait that is not consistent
with a child that is still capable of change. 65
The focus of the Court in Miller was the mandatory penalty that was in
place for sentences.66 Under this sentencing scheme, juveniles were
sentenced under the same guidelines as adults. 67 This is a problem because
as explained in Graham, Roper, and Eddings, juveniles are vastly different
than adults, thus different factors should be considered when sentencing
them to this kind of punishment. 68 The Court noted that a life-withoutparole sentence shared characteristics with death sentences, which as stated
in Roper, is considered cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment.69 The Court further cited to Solem v. Helm to point out that
this is an especially harsh punishment for a juvenile because he or she will
spend a greater percentage of his or her life in jail than an adult who
receives the same sentence. 70 Thus, the Supreme Court found that a
mandatory life-without-parole sentence violated the Eighth Amendment


60.

Miller, 132 U.S. at 461.

61.

Id. at 469.

62.

Id. at 471.

63.

Id. at 461.

64.

Id.

65.

Miller, 132 U.S. at 472–73.

66.

Id. at 474.

67.

Id.

68.
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 598–99
(2005); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 116 (1982).
69.

Miller, 132 U.S. at 474.

70.

Miller, 132 U.S. at 475; cf. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 300–01 (1983).
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and required a sentencing judge to take into account the difference between
juveniles and adults.71 This decision does not, however, bar a sentencing
judge from imposing a life sentence on a juvenile.72
B.

Lack of Guidance: The Effects of Graham & Miller

With approximately 2500 inmates in prison who were sentenced as
juveniles prior to the Miller decision, State prosecutors are being
bombarded with a new caseload. 73 Inmates who were once sentenced to
life-without-parole are now taking advantage of this opportunity by filing
post-conviction motions for courts to review their case in light of these
decisions.74 The problem stems from the Supreme Court not explicitly
stating in its Miller decision whether this new law would only be applied
prospectively or also be applied retroactively.75 Subsection one will discuss
how courts addressed retroactivity in Florida leading up to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Montgomery v. Louisiana. Subsection two will discuss
how courts throughout the states addressed retroactivity leading up to the
Supreme Court’s decision in Montgomery v. Louisiana.
1.

Retroactive Application Throughout Florida

Less than a year before the Supreme Court’s decision in Montgomery
v. Louisiana, the Florida Supreme Court came to its own decision on
whether Miller would be applied retroactively. 76 The Court in Falcon v.
State held that the Supreme Court’s decision in Miller should be applied
retroactively to a juvenile whose conviction was final at the time Miller was
decided.77 This Court primarily relied on two Florida decisions to
determine retroactive application. 78 In Witt v. State, the Court established
three guidelines that determine when a new law is applied retroactively in


71.

Miller, 132 U.S. at 479.

72.

Id. at 483.

73.

Rovner, supra note 11, at 1.

74.

See id. at 4.

75.
Brianna H. Boone, Note, Treating Adults Like Children: Re-Sentencing Adult Juvenile
Lifers After Miller v. Alabama, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1159, 1168–69 (2015).
76.

Falcon v. State, 162 So. 3d 954, 956 (Fla. 2015).

77.

Id.

78.

Id. at 960–62.
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Florida.79 A change in law is applied retroactively in Florida when: “1. it
emanates from this Court or the United States Supreme Court;” 2. “is
constitutional in nature;” and 3. “constitutes a development of fundamental
significance.”80 In this case, the first two prongs can be indisputably
established; the Court in Falcon was only concerned with determining
whether the Miller decision constituted a development of fundamental
significance.81
Using Witt as its foundation, the Court then cited to Toye v. State in
which the Second District Court of Appeal of Florida determined that the
Miller decision was retroactive. 82 Prior to the Miller decision, Florida
courts were required under the statutory sentencing guidelines to sentence a
juvenile offender convicted of capital homicide to a life sentence without
the possibility of parole. 83 The opinion in Toye reasoned that the Miller
decision “effectively invalidated Florida Statute § 775.082 (1)84, essentially
invalidating the only statutory means of imposing a life sentence without
the possibility for parole for juveniles”; thus, satisfying the third prong
under the Witt analysis.85
The rationale behind its decision emphasized that the State has an
interest in the finality of convictions. 86 It further argued that litigation must
stop at some point; thus, the “absence of finality casts a cloud of
tentativeness over the criminal justice system.” 87 Despite this reasoning,


79.

Witt v. State, 387 So. 2d 922, 931 (Fla. 1980).

80.

Id.

81.

Falcon, 162 So. 2d at 960–61.

82.

Toye v. State, 133 So. 3d 540, 547 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014).

83.

Falcon, 162 So. 3d at 961–62.

84.

FLA. STAT. § 775.082(1)(b)(1) (2016):
A person who actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim and
who is convicted under s. 782.04 of a capital felony, or an offense that was
reclassified as a capital felony, which was committed before the person attained
eighteen years of age shall be punished by a term of imprisonment for life if, after
a sentencing hearing conducted by the court in accordance with s. 921.1401, the
court finds that life imprisonment is an appropriate sentence. If the court finds
that life imprisonment is not an appropriate sentence, such person shall be
punished by a term of imprisonment of at least forty years.

85.

Falcon, 162 So. 3d at 961; Toye, 133 So. 3d at 543.

86.

Falcon, 162 So. 3d at 960.

87.

Id.
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the Court believes that if Miller is not applied retroactively throughout the
courts, there is a “patent unfairness” of having inmates who were sentenced
prior to Miller to continue to serve life sentences, while others get the
opportunity to serve lesser sentences because their convictions were not
final when the Miller decision was issued.88 In continuing with the idea of
fairness, the Court determined that given this decision, the appropriate
remedy would be for inmates to present a timely Rule 3.850(b)(2) 89 motion
for postconviction relief. 90 Once an inmate applies for this motion, courts
should hold an individualized hearing pursuant to section two of chapter
2014-220, where the court will “consider the enumerated and any other
pertinent factors relevant to the defendant’s youth and attendant
circumstances.” 91
Section one of chapter 2014-220 requires a factfinder to determine
whether the defendant “actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill
the victim.”92 If the courts find that this is the case, the defendant must
receive at least forty years’ imprisonment with a subsequent review after
twenty-five years.93 If the factfinder determines that the defendant did not
“actually kill, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim,” the factfinder
has more discretion in determining a sentence of any lesser term of years. 94
In the recent decision of Atwell v. State, the Florida Supreme Court
addressed the current conflict between Florida’s parole system and the
Supreme Court’s decision in Montgomery v. Louisiana.95 The opinion in
this case addressed that an examination of Florida’s statutes and
administrative rules governing the parole system demonstrated “that a
juvenile who committed a capital offense could be subject to the same harsh
penalties as an adult without considering any mitigating circumstances.” 96


88.

Id. at 962.

89.
Rule 3.850(b)(2) Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence. “[T]he fundamental
constitutional right asserted was not established within the period provided for herein and has been held
to apply retroactively, and the claim is made within two years of the date of the mandate of the decision
announcing the retroactivity.” Id.
90.

Falcon, 162 So. 3d at 964.

91.

Id.

92.

FLA. STAT. § 775.082(1)(b)(1) (2016); Falcon, 162 So. 3d at 963.

93.

Falcon, 162 So. 3d at 963.

94.

FLA. STAT. § 775.082(1)(b)(1) (2016); Falcon, 162 So. 3d at 963.

95.

Atwell v. State, 197 So. 3d 1040, 1048 (Fla. 2015).

96.

Id. at 1049.
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Essentially, the decision to parole an inmate in Florida is considered “an act
of grace of the state . . . ” and the objective parole criteria, by statute must
“give primary weight to the seriousness of the offender’s present criminal
offense and the offender’s past criminal record.” 97
The requirements set out by Florida’s parole system clearly did not
afford special protections to juvenile offenders and do not take into
consideration the diminished culpability of the juvenile at the time of the
offense; essentially, the requirements established in Miller are not a part of
Florida’s parole system guidelines. 98 Subsequent to the Miller and Graham
decision, Florida Legislatures enacted a new sentencing framework for
juvenile offenders instead of offering parole as a means of complying with
the Supreme Court’s decision.99 This new framework offers “term-of-years
sentencing options for trial courts” and “subsequent judicial review of
lengthy sentences.”100 Further, under this framework, the sentencing court
can impose a forty years to life imprisonment sentence after it has taken
into consideration the youth-related sentencing factors.101
Under Atwell, a juvenile offender has the opportunity to have his case
reviewed by a trial judge after twenty-five years, and that judge will then
determine whether the offender’s sentence modification is warranted or
not.102 A court will consider other factors, such as: juvenile offender’s
youth and other characteristics at the time he committed the offense; “the
opinion of the victim or the victim’s next of kin concerning the release of


97.

FLA. STAT. § 947.002(2), (5) (2016); Atwell, 197 So. 3d at 1049.

98.
Atwell, 197 So. 3d at 1047–48. “Parole is the release of an inmate, prior to the expiration
of the inmate’s court-imposed sentence,” followed by a period of supervision that is required to be
successfully completed by compliance with the conditions and terms set out in the release agreement
ordered by the Florida Commission on Offender Review. Id. The parole process begins with an initial
interview with an eligible inmate and a hearing examiner. Id. At this meeting the examiner will use a
salient factor score, “as well as the statutory severity of the inmate’s offense to determine a
corresponding range of months on a matrix that will automatically provide a range of presumptive
parole release dates.” Id. Under Florida statutory law, objective parole guidelines “must give primary
weight to the seriousness” of the inmate’s past and present criminal offenses. Id. Once these factors are
taken into consideration, the hearing examiner will provide the Commission with a written
recommendation on the presumptive parole release dates, which are then reviewed by a panel of no
more than two commissioners. Id. Once the presumptive parole release date arrives and the inmate’s
institutional conduct and parole release plan is satisfactory, then the date will become effective and the
Commission will then have a final review process to determine is the release date is still appropriate and
will authorize or modify the date accordingly. Id.
99.

Atwell, 197 So. 3d at 1042; see Horsley v. State, 160 So. 3d 393, 407 (Fla. 2015).

100.

Atwell, 197 So. 3d at 1042.

101.

Id. at 1043.

102.

Id.
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the offender from prison; and whether the juvenile offender remains at the
same level of risk to society.” 103 In light of these considerations, the
Florida Supreme Court quashed the Fourth District’s decision upholding
Atwell’s life sentence for first-degree murder and remanded the case for
resentencing in order to conform to Florida Statute. 104

2.

Retroactive Application Throughout the United States

Prior to Montgomery, several courts addressed the issue of
retroactivity in order to determine when it was appropriate to apply a new
ruling retroactively.105 The Supreme Court turned away from its common
law approach in 1965 and adopted a new decision in Linkletter v. Walker.106
This case established that the Constitution does not require the courts to
apply cases retroactively, nor does it prohibit a court from applying a
decision retroactively. 107 Therefore, the Court established a three-part test
that would aid in determining whether a decision should be applied
retroactively. 108 This test first weighs the merits and demerits of the case
by looking at the “history of the rule in question.” 109 Second, the Court
turns to the purpose and effect of the decision. 110 Third, the Court
determines whether the purpose of the decision “will further or retard its
operation.” 111
Throughout the years, this decision received a vast amount of criticism
given that it provided inconsistent results, which gave the courts too much
freedom in deciding which decisions would receive retroactive
application.112 Justice Harlan, a critic to the Linkletter test, addressed the
picking and choosing by the courts of those who do and do not receive the
“benefit of a ‘new’ rule” and provided a distinction between direct review


103.

Id.

104.

FLA. STAT. §§ 775.082, 921.1401–02 (2016); Atwell, 197 So. 3d at 1040.

105.

See infra Part II, Section B.

106. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965); contra Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314,
321–22 (1987).
107.

Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 629.

108.

Id.

109.

Id.

110.

Id.

111.

Id.

112. Matthew R. Doherty, The Reluctance Towards Retroactivity: The Retroactive Application
of Laws in Death Penalty Collateral Review Cases, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 445, 453–54 (2004).
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cases and collateral review cases in his dissent in Desist v. United States.113
Justice Harlan argued that when a procedural due process rule is under
collateral review, the rule should not be applied retroactively unless it
provides “certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the
power of the criminal-law making authority to proscribe”; or if “it requires
the observance of those procedures that are implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty.” 114
In 1989, the Supreme Court in Teague v. Lane decided that all new
rules, whether substantive or procedural, would be applied retroactively
whenever they were under direct review. 115 The plurality opinion further
determined that a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure would not
be applied retroactively to a case on collateral review. 116 With this
precedent in mind, it is understandable that courts throughout the states
were somewhat uncertain on what to do after the Miller decision. The
Constitution requires state collateral review courts to give retroactive effect
to a new substantive rule of constitutional law that controls the outcome of
a case.117 This uncertainty resulted in states applying the Miller decision in
different ways.118 Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, and Pennsylvania are
just a few states that decided that the decision in Miller was procedural and
not substantive, meaning that it is not a new rule. 119 Similarly, there was no
consensus among federal courts on the issue. 120 Given the inconsistencies
among state and federal courts regarding the application of Miller, the
Supreme Court came to a decision that would create uniformity throughout
the states.121
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Montgomery v. Louisiana: Uniform Retroactivity

As of last year, the Supreme Court held in Montgomery v. Louisiana
that the “federal Constitution requires state collateral review courts to give
retroactive effect to new substantive rules of federal constitutional law.”122
Further, the Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama, prohibiting
under Eighth Amendment mandatory life sentences without parole for
juvenile offenders, “announced a new substantive constitutional rule that
was retroactive on state collateral review.”123 The Supreme Court’s focus
was determining whether Miller was substantive or procedural; the Court
noted that Miller is “no less substantive than Roper and Graham” because it
reserved life without parole sentences strictly for those juveniles “whose
crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility.” 124 The decision in Miller does
have a procedural component to it. 125 The procedural component the Court
refers to is the sentencing judge’s requirement to consider a juvenile
offender’s “youth and attendant characteristics” when deciding whether a
life without parole sentence is appropriate or not. 126
The State of Louisiana attempted to refute this contention;
nonetheless, the Court fought back and justified its view by explaining that
sometimes in order to implement substantive rules, a procedural
requirement is necessary to only regulate “the manner of determining a
defendant’s culpability.”127 This decision was received with hesitation and
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas and Justice Alito, dissented due to
their belief that the Court had no jurisdiction in deciding this case; they
believed that the way in which the Court arrived at this decision was
wrong.128
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JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM & THE CONSEQUENCE OF THESE
DECISIONS

As previously noted, courts have emphasized re-sentencing juveniles
who committed heinous crimes at a young age. Their focus stems from the
fact that juveniles, among other factors, are vastly different than adults
because they are more susceptible to negative influences, have an
underdeveloped sense of responsibility, and their character is not as well
formed.129 An important issue that is not addressed by the courts is that
many of these defendants are no longer juveniles. 130 Many of the inmates
who are filing motions for post-conviction release are far beyond the age of
seventeen.131 Essentially, these men are not vastly different from adults,
because they are adults and no longer have the factors listed in Roper,
which courts heavily rely on. 132 In fact, many of them have developed their
character and no longer carry the unique characteristics of youthfulness that
are pertinent to children. 133 However, the courts still feel that these men
deserve a second chance at having their case heard because it is “patently
unfair” to have inmates who were convicted prior to the Miller decision to
not have a chance at re-sentencing.134
Further, courts are not taking into consideration the ultimate effect that
re-sentencing proceedings have on state prosecutors.135 Prosecutors are
constantly assigned new cases, which in turn affects their performance and
ultimately hurts the defendant and the victim’s families. 136 One final issue
that the courts do not discuss and for which there is little research on is the
effect that re-sentencing has on the families of the victims who believed this
horrific experience in their life was behind them.137 The following
subsections will discuss the effect that retroactive application has on the
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state prosecutors as well as the families of the homicide victims who are
forced to relive the death of a loved one.
A.

Should “Juveniles” Sentenced to Life Without Parole Be Subject to
Re-Sentencing?

A juvenile’s experience in the prison environment can ultimately
affect them for the rest of their lives; for example, depending on the facility
they are sent to, juveniles sent to adult prisons are sometimes placed in
isolation for up to twenty-three hours for their own protection. 138 In
addition to assessing mitigating factors when looking at the offender’s
youth and attendant characteristics at the time he or she was sentenced, the
court should also consider how the defendant has developed in the prison
environment.139
B.

Overburdened State Prosecutors

The U.S. Department of Justice conducted a National Census of State
Prosecutors in 2007, where it found that the average caseload for a
prosecuting attorney consisted of ninety-four felony cases for a full-time
office.140 Further, it found that prosecutors’ offices, which serve more than
a million residents, had, on average, 11,952 felony case convictions.141 A
study conducted by the American Prosecutors Research Institute attempted
to determine how many cases a prosecutor, on average, should be able to
handle by using homicide cases as an example.142 They asked prosecutors
to keep track of the total hours and number of dispositions for their
homicide cases at three different disposition stages: Pre-charge, Pre-trial,


138. Jason Ziedenberg, You’re An Adult Now: Youth in Adult Criminal Justice Systems, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUST. NAT’L INST. OF CORRECTIONS 1, 10 (Dec. 2011), http://www.iacpyouth.org/portals/0/
content_files/You%E2%80%99re%20an%20Adult%20Now%20-%20Youth%20in%20Adult%20Crimi
nal%20Justice%20Systems.pdf.
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Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 483 (2012).

140. Steven W. Perry & Duren Banks, Prosecutors in State Courts, 2007 - Statistical Tables,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.: BUREAU OF J UST. STAT. 1, 5 (Dec. 2011), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/
psc07st.pdf (citing to table 4).
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142. How Many Cases Should a Prosecutor Handle? Results of the National Workload
Assessment Project, AM. PROSECUTORS RES. INST. 1, 1 (2002), http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/How%20Many
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and Trial.143 In total, the average time that should be allotted to bring a
homicide case to a pre-charge disposition is 39 hours, 110 hours for a pretrial disposition, and a total of 246 hours for a trial disposition. 144 Using
this example, the study also took into account the amount of cases that can
be handled along with the resources available and concluded that the
average case weight was approximately ninety hours. 145
Using the average case processing time allowed this study to
determine an estimate on the average amount of cases a prosecutor can
properly handle. 146 This was determined by calculating the actual time that
is available to prosecutors per year and actual case processing time. 147 This
calculation was done by dividing the year value—time available in a year—
and the case weight—taking into account the type of case, and that results
in the workload measure. 148 Using the previous example and considering
only homicide case weight, the average prosecutor can handle about twenty
homicide cases per year, taking into consideration that this prosecutor only
works on homicide cases. 149 Further, this study notes that these are
homicides at the pre-trial stage; if these were taken to trial, the case weight
would be more.150
Prosecutor Jessica Cooper from Oakland County reacted to the
retroactive application of Miller: “We have to find all the underlying facts
of the case . . . review all of those. It’s like we have 49 cold cases.” 151
Every re-sentencing case requires a prosecutor to dedicate a significant
amount of time and effort which, based on the previously discussed study,
is difficult to do considering their overwhelming caseload.152
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The Effects of this Change on the Families and Friends of the Victims

Another important aspect that courts have yet to address is the effect
the re-sentencing process has on the families of the victims. Research has
shown that families of murder victims are “likely to experience
psychological difficulties” after losing a loved one in a traumatizing way,
such as depression and posttraumatic stress disorder.153 Families of
homicide victims experience loss in a way that is unknown to most
families.154 They have been subjected to an unexpected, tragic loss and
simply seek justice for their loved ones.155 As Marilyn Peterson Armour
found in her study on the subject, family members of homicide victims are
neglected and they are not treated as the secondary victims that they are. 156
Further, these family members are indirectly forced to grieve their loss with
the public because the murder of their loved one becomes a public event. 157
This results in prolonged bereavement that is controlled by the state and
social milieu.158
Essentially, whether these families want to or not, they are forced to be
a part of the criminal justice system where they often feel their voice is not
heard, resulting in feelings of anger and frustration.159 A study conducted
in Bowling Green State University looked into the experience of thirteen
families of homicide victims and discussed how the “death of their loved
one affected their life . . . the needs that arose as a result of this
victimization as well as any services they used” or found useful, and their
overall experience with the criminal justice system. 160 In “a system focused
on processing offenders, with victim needs constituting a subsidiary
interest,” the families felt an overall lack of compassion, struggle for
control, conflicting goals, and a devaluation of life. 161
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Families reported that they did not “understand why a system which
they believed should be protecting the interests of murder victims, was, in
their view, so accommodating to defendants.” 162 One mother from the
study asked, “Why are their rights so guarded when they stole every right of
our child?”163 Although this was a small interest group from Ohio, one
could infer that many of the families that are being subjected to the resentencing of a defendant, who stole the life of their loved ones, are feeling
the same way.164 Another family member stated, “I thought that everybody
would be looking out for our interests, and they’re not. It’s completely
opposite. It’s all about them.” 165
The families in this study also found that one of the more difficult
parts of their process in the system was accepting the sentences received by
the offenders in their cases.166 They reported feeling that their loved one’s
life was “devalued”; none of them felt that the defendant in their case
received a sentence that was representative of the harm they caused. 167
Assuming arguendo, if this is the common sentiment of most homicide
victim-families, re-sentencing juveniles will have most of these families
feel as though the system does not care about serving justice for their loved
ones because they are, once again, devaluing their life by allowing the
defendant to possibly receive a shorter sentence.
The criminal justice system, in many jurisdictions, does make an
attempt to help and provide support to the families of homicide victims by
giving them the option to consult a victim advocate. 168 The study
conducted by Bowling Green State University found that a few of the
families mentioned having an advocate. 169 When asked, those that did have
an advocate had positive things to say about their experience with them. 170
Those who did not mention having an advocate were asked to shed light on
why they did not have one, and one mother explained, “There was only one
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victim’s advocate that I recall. 171 That had to be an overwhelming job for
one person because there was so much going on at the time.”172
In 2014, the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) reported an
estimate of 14,249 murders in the United States. 173 It is impossible to
realistically provide each one of those murder-victim’s families with an
advocate with the current system in place.174 The study conducted by
Bowling Green State University further confirmed that current findings
show that our criminal justice system may not be sufficiently equipped to
meet the needs of these grieving families. 175 Our system should place more
of an emphasis on helping the families of these victims. With re-sentencing
hearings quickly rising throughout the country, our criminal justice system
needs to promote and provide outreach groups for these families.
The National Organization of Parents of Murdered Children, Inc. is a
nationwide organization that seeks to help the survivors of homicide
victims.176 This organization provides programs and services to grieving
families by spreading awareness, training and informing society on the
problems faced in the aftermath of murder, assisting in resolving unsolved
cases, and helping keep murderers behind bars.177 If our criminal justice
system were to have their victim advocates work alongside an organization
such as this one, more families could possibly receive the help and support
they need with the current re-sentencing changes.
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JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

The United Kingdom

England and Wales has one of the highest rates of youth crime and
violence in Europe. 178 In fact, England has one of the largest youth
custodial populations in Europe. 179 Policymakers have worked towards
reforming the juvenile justice system since the early 1900s by developing
legislation that provides a reasonable means of prevention and early
intervention. 180 The process of creating this system for juvenile offenders
has been a long process of trial and error.181 In 1982, policymakers passed
the Criminal Justice Act of 1982, which represented “one of the first pieces
of modern youth policy reform.” 182 The Act set boundaries for judges when
ordering a custodial sentence by requiring the judge to choose from three
criteria before sentencing: “the youth has been unresponsive to noncustodial punishment; custody will ensure public safety; or the severity of
the offense warrants custodial placement.”183 Prior to the establishment of
this Act, there were approximately 7700 juveniles ages fourteen to sixteen
in custody; that number decreased to 3200 after the Act was passed.184
This progressive Act effectively decreased the number of juveniles in
custody; legislators passed two separate acts given the lack of
alternatives—The Children’s Act of 1989 and The Criminal Justice Act of
1991—that separated juvenile offenders from juveniles in need of care. 185
The Acts further pushed the juvenile courts to order alternatives to custody
such as informal warnings and police reprimands. 186 The Acts were
structured to help juvenile offenders committing minor crimes; this became
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an issue in 1993 when two ten-year-old boys abducted and killed a child. 187
The lack of attention placed on juvenile murderers brought about the
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act of 1994. 188 The public demanded
stricter penalties for juvenile offenders, which extended custodial sentences
to juveniles, ages ten to fourteen. 189 With stricter sentences, the juvenile
population housed in juvenile prisons increased.190
In 1998, legislators, yet again, passed another act, which introduced an
order for juvenile offenders and their parents. 191 The Crime and Disorder
Act of 1998 is considered to be one of the most “radical and challenging”
legislations enacted to reduce crime. 192 In addition to providing child safety
orders and child curfew schemes, it established orders for anti-social
behavior, sex offenders, and parenting, just to name a few. 193 In regards to
its focus on children, the Act sought to prevent juvenile crimes rather than
focusing on rehabilitating juveniles and providing them with other options
that did not involve incarceration. 194 Despite the controversy surrounding
the Act, it effectively reduced the custody of the juveniles by shortening
their time in prison.195 Further, it made the parents more involved in the
lives of their children by creating parenting orders where parents were
required to “take control of their children and participate in parenting skills
classes.” 196 Should the parents decide not to participate or follow the order,
parents would receive a fine and risk possible imprisonment if they neglect
to pay the fine.197
The United Kingdom’s goal was to shift its approach from custodyThis has resulted in the
based to divisionary juvenile justice. 198
establishment of two community-based options for offenders: Suspended
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Sentence Orders and Community Orders. 199 These options provided
offenders with an opportunity to remain in the community as opposed to
receiving prison time. 200 This program was established in 2005 as a result
of the increasing juvenile population in prisons. 201 The youth prisons in
England remain flawed and costly. 202 The Youth Justice Board continues to
work on more effective means of punishment that allow for juveniles to
remain in the community and to reduce incarceration rates.203
B.

Comparative Analysis: United States and the United Kingdom

Much like the United States, the United Kingdom has high juvenile
incarceration rates.204 With an increase from 100 to 824 juveniles in prison,
the United Kingdom noticed the problem and began reforming the juvenile
justice system.205 Given that most of these juveniles were incarcerated for
non-violent offenses, policymakers passed “one of the first pieces of
modern youth policy reform.” 206 The United States also realized, although
in a different way, the harsh penalties juvenile offenders were receiving for
non-violent offenses in Graham v. Florida.207 The Court in Graham
determined that the penalty should be proportional to the offense, therefore,
sentencing a juvenile to life-without-parole for a non-homicide offense was
considered cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. 208
Although the United Kingdom has dealt with the issue in a different
way, the ultimate purpose remains the same. 209 Juveniles should receive
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punishments that fit the crime they committed. 210 The United Kingdom has
worked towards fixing the issue by creating a variety of different acts aimed
at providing juveniles with other options that do not involve
incarceration.211 The different acts, however, have not remedied the
problem. The United Kingdom and the United States continue to have high
juvenile incarceration rates, which seem to consistently fluctuate. 212
V.
A.

JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM IN COLOMBIA

Colombia

The Colombian juvenile justice system traditionally did not have a
system tailored for juveniles. 213 Instead, judges took on a parent-like
discretionary role resulting in a tutelary-like system where juveniles were
sometimes treated in the same way as adults. 214 The juvenile justice system
in Colombia was reformed in 1989 and again in 1990; thus, they now have
the Code on Minors and the Code on Childhood and Adolescence. 215 Prior
to establishing the Code on Minors and the Code on Childhood and
Adolescence, there were only three options for juveniles at the time of
sentencing: community service, probation, or imprisonment. 216 This
resulted in juveniles being sentenced with adults and having indeterminate
sentences that allowed prison staff to extend a juvenile’s sentence for as
long as he or she thought would be best.217 Now, the system allows for
juveniles to be held criminally responsible for: reprimand, community
service, probation, or incarceration in a semi-closed or fully closed
facility.218
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Colombia pursued their mission to restore their juvenile justice system
by enacting the standards of the United Nations.219 With this new reform,
Colombia now requires that the minimum age of criminal responsibility be
Younger children who commit crimes are still held
eighteen.220
responsible, however, they are prosecuted under the juvenile justice system,
as opposed to removing them to adult courts. 221 The goal of their system is
to rehabilitate and restore in juvenile punishment and promote the
pedagogical approach much like the United States of America. 222 This is a
difficult goal to achieve given Colombia’s history of rebellion and
insurgency as a result of using children as soldiers by guerilla forces.223 In
the process of developing a fair juvenile justice system, Colombian
legislatures have decided that minors are not to be held accountable for war
crimes they were a part of. 224
In 2006, Law 1098 updated the Code on Adolescence and Childhood,
which added references to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of
Children (UN CRC) and removed a clause that allowed for juveniles to be
prosecuted under the Criminal Code, unless they were being charged with a
serious crime. 225 Law 1098 created the System for Youth Criminal
Responsibility, which outlined twelve principles for the protection of
juveniles and specialized a system seeking to rehabilitate juveniles as
opposed to simply incarcerating them. 226 The detention facilities are now
strictly available for minors and are managed by the Colombian Institute for
Family Welfare. 227 Despite all the efforts placed into creating a fair system
for juveniles, there has been an increase in juvenile detention. 228 “In 2014,


219. PAOLA ZALKIND & RITA J. SIMON, GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON SOC. ISSUES: JUVENILE
JUSTICE SYSTEMS 1, 30–35 (Lexington Books 2004). Colombia was “one of the few countries in the
world to enact the standards of the United Nations.” Id.
220.

Id. at 30.

221.

Id.

222.

Pierce, supra note 213.

223.

ZALKIND & SIMON, supra note 219, at 30.

224.

Id. at 31.

225.

Pierce, supra note 213.

226.

Id.

227.

Id.

228.

Id.

2018]

Picart

503

8060 juveniles under the age of 18 were under the supervision of the
System for Youth Criminal Responsibility, and 3145 were incarcerated.” 229
B.

Comparative Analysis: United States and Colombia

Colombia relies on the Code on Minors and the Code on Childhood
and Adolescence to regulate their juvenile justice system. 230 The United
States, on the other hand, relies primarily on case law and a juvenile’s
Constitutional rights to regulate their juvenile justice system. 231 Colombia
has evolved, much like the United States, in developing appropriate
sentences for juveniles.232 This is possible as a result of Colombian
legislators re-shifting their approach through more regulation on the
treatment of juveniles and the levels of punishment they can receive.233
Given that Colombia has a problem with juveniles being recruited by
guerilla forces, the government has modified its system to avoid criminally
punishing juveniles who were forcibly recruited into these groups. 234
Although the United States does not have a problem with forced guerilla
recruitment, it too has modified its laws in order to provide fair punishment
for juveniles.235 Analogous to Colombia, the United States noted the unfair
treatment that juvenile offenders were experiencing in receiving life
sentences without parole for non-homicide offenses, and moved towards
improving its system by holding in Graham that this punishment was
unconstitutional.236 Juveniles are vastly different than adults, therefore their
sentences should not be the same. 237
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JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM IN AUSTRALIA

Australia

For years now, Australia has addressed the issues behind the juvenile
justice system in many ways. 238 For example, in 1895, the country
established a court for youthful offenders.239 Further, the courts have
allowed officers to have discretion when handling a juvenile who has
violated the law. 240 Officers have the option to issue a formal or informal
citation, or to refer the juvenile to the Youth Justice Court.241 Officers opt
to help juveniles and involve them in community-based supervision instead
of sending them to jail. 242 Community-based supervision consists of a
variety of options for juveniles including: probation, parole, youth
supervision orders, and youth attendance orders. 243 As a result, youth
incarceration rates in Australia are significantly lower than in the United
States.244 In 2006 and 2007, there were 10,675 juveniles under formal
supervision in Australia—83% were under community-based supervision,
46% were under detention supervision, and 29% were in both forms of
supervision.245
Juveniles that do not qualify for community-based supervision either
plead guilty or are found guilty, and ninety-two percent of the adjudicated
cases result in a non-custodial sentence. 246 This is a result of policymakers
in Australia striving to remove juveniles from the criminal justice system
and reduce the time they spend incarcerated.247 Juvenile justice throughout
Australia differs in each territory because each government has its own set
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of laws and diversionary options. 248 Each region has implemented its own
method of addressing juvenile justice in order to provide juveniles with a
fair chance at life.249
For example, in Victoria the government has strived to reform their
juvenile system since 2000. 250 High-risk juveniles are separated from
dangerous juveniles and are sent into rehabilitative programs and
transitional support systems have been implemented to aid juveniles in
transitioning out of custody. 251 Western Australia bases their juvenile
justice system off the Young Offenders Act of 1994. 252 This Act seeks to
keep juveniles out of the judicial system and instead rehabilitates them.253
Implementing this kind of system has an annual cost of $190,000 per
juvenile—a very expensive alternative with long-term benefits.254 Western
Australia has also implemented an Intensive Supervision Program designed
for juvenile offenders considered the state’s more serious repeat
offenders.255 In establishing this program, Western Australia has reduced
recidivism and lowered taxpayer costs for imprisonment.256 This program
provides juveniles with opportunities to participate in therapeutic and
mediation programs.257
Given that each state has its own set of juvenile laws, the incarceration
rates fluctuate throughout the country.258 The Northern Territory, for
example, has the highest incarceration rates in Australia.259 This is most
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likely a result of their intolerance for repeat offenders.260 Unlike other
regions, Corrective Services prohibit these juveniles from diversions such
as written or oral warnings and victim-offender conferences.261 One
interesting factor is the weight the government places on a juvenile
offender’s parent and their involvement in the juvenile’s life. 262 For
example, the Family Responsibility Order requires parents to become more
involved in their child’s life by ensuring their child follows through with
any conditions required of them, such as: “ensuring their child attends
school, ensuring their child is home by a certain time or that the child
avoids contact with a particular person or place.”263 The parents are held
accountable under this order and if they fail to fulfill their duties, the
parents will be punished with fines and/or seizing of non-essential
household items just to name a few. 264
B.

Comparative Analysis: United States and Australia

Australia’s effective juvenile system has positively impacted its
juvenile offenders.265 This effective system and generally low incarceration
rates are a result of the country’s emphasis on minimizing the number of
juveniles in prison. 266 Much like the United States, Australia has
specialized courts for juvenile offenders. 267 However, Australia provides
juveniles with more options than the United States.268
In providing its juvenile offenders with community-based supervision,
Australia reserves incarceration for its serious juvenile offenders. 269 The
United States has moved towards lowering the rate of incarcerated juvenile
offenders for minor offenses through case law, thereby assuring harsh
penalties be reserved for serious crimes. 270 Jurisdictions in the United
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States increasingly use similar methods to conserve financial resources and
reduce youth incarceration. 271 As previously mentioned, courts are also
placing a greater amount of responsibilities on the juvenile offenders’
parents.272 Legislators in the United States have not established a Family
Responsibility Order-like act that would require juvenile offenders’ parents
to become more involved in their child’s life.273 Should this be
implemented, young offenders may receive the structure they desperately
need in the United States.
VII.
CONCLUSION: HOW CAN THE SYSTEM BE IMPROVED? SHOULD
JUVENILES WHO WERE SENTENCED TO LIFE W ITHOUT PAROLE BE SUBJECT
TO RE-SENTENCING?
“Unlike other countries, we fail to acknowledge their youthfulness and
often other factors that contribute to their crimes.” 274 The United States has
traditionally had a “tough on crime” view, which has been applied to
juveniles throughout the years.275 The Supreme Court in Graham and
Miller ultimately sought to re-structure the sentencing scheme for juveniles
to give them a real chance at life. The Court emphasized this issue because
it effectively established that juveniles are vastly different than adults for
several reasons.276 Given these differences, the Court found that sentencing
juveniles to life without parole was considered cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth Amendment.277 Imposing the harshest
sentences on juveniles does not satisfy the penological justifications of
retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.
Although the Court makes a great argument for re-structuring the
juvenile sentencing schemes, their decision in Montgomery v. Louisiana
tackles a different issue while still applying the decisions of Graham and
Miller. By applying these decisions retroactively, the Court is allowing
inmates who were sentenced prior to 2012 to have their case reviewed by a
judge who will look at the inmates’ youth and attendant circumstances at
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the time of the offense. However, the Court has not addressed the fact that
some of inmates are no longer juveniles. Most of the inmates, whom this
law affects, have spent their young adult lives in prison, are no longer
juveniles, and have learned to adapt to prison life. These inmates are being
re-sentenced as juveniles, yet most of them are no longer juveniles.
Granted, some of these juveniles committed non-homicide offenses; thus,
those who committed homicide offenses should not be afforded the same
benefit as seen in the Montgomery decision.
In issuing this landmark decision, the Supreme Court should have first
taken into consideration whether the inmates that would be applying for a
resentencing hearing were fit to be released back into society. Making
Miller a retroactive decision not only impacts a significant number of
prisoners, but it also places an additional burden on an already
overburdened state. Further, re-sentencing cases greatly affect the families
of homicide victims whom are forced to relive a horrific moment in their
lives. The families of these victims are considered secondary victims
whom are thrown into the criminal justice system unexpectedly while
simultaneously grieving the loss of a loved one. Having them relive this
experience re-exposes them to the trauma, which could lead to permanent
long-term effects.
The juvenile justice system in the United States is by no means a
perfect system. In comparing the United States to other countries, it is clear
that each country has undergone a process of trial and error to find a fair
and impartial juvenile justice system. 278 Offering juveniles a second chance
at life is an important issue that the Supreme Court continuously works to
achieve.279 Ultimately, plenty of studies and case law demonstrate that
juveniles are vastly different than adults.280 Therefore, they should not be
treated and sentenced in the same way. However, while courts are shedding
light on this issue, they are ignoring other important factors that also require
their attention. Unlike the United Kingdom, Colombia, and Australia, laws
in the United States do not provide many options for juvenile offenders. 281
Legislators should consider incorporating more community-based
programs, which allow courts more leeway when determining an
appropriate sentence for a juvenile offender. Further, legislators should
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incorporate, much like in Australia, the families of juveniles and hold them
accountable for aiding in the rehabilitative process.
Given the recent decisions discussed in this article, courts throughout
the states are constantly adapting and re-organizing themselves while
attempting to properly handle these cases. Each area still requires a
significant amount of research, which will only come with time. With big
decisions come big consequences.
The Supreme Court’s new
implementations should be fair for all, not just the defendants. Juveniles
know how to distinguish right from wrong. They know they can be
punished if they steal. They know that killing someone can send them to
prison. Our focus should be on helping these juveniles by finding
appropriate sentences that fit the crime they committed. However, it is
crucial not to lose sight of the fact that these juvenile-based laws are being
applied to those who committed heinous crimes.

